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Symbolizing crime control
Reflections on Zero Tolerance
TIM NEWBURN AND TREVOR JONES
London School of Economics, UK and Cardiff University, UK
Abstract
The term Zero Tolerance has become a familiar feature of the crime
control landscape. In recent times it has been deployed regularly by
politicians, police managers, policy-makers and the media. Though
it has been used in connection with a number of different policy
initiatives, Zero Tolerance is most closely associated with policing
and, in particular, with a set of policing strategies adopted by the
New York Police Department in the 1990s. This article explores the
origins of this most potent of crime control symbols, and examines
how it has subsequently been developed, deployed and
disseminated. It concludes with an examination of how and why
policy actors deploy symbolically powerful terms in the context of
contemporary crime politics in the USA and UK.
Key Words
penal policy • policing • policy entrepreneurs • policy transfer •
symbolic politics • Zero Tolerance
The need was for a leader … to set standards, enforce discipline, create
checks and balances, establish quality controls, communicate a zero toler-
ance for abuse of detainees, and enforce that policy by quickly and efficiently
punishing offenders.
(The Fay-Jones Report into Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib)1
I think there ought to be zero tolerance of people breaking the law during an
emergency such as this, whether it be looting, or price-gouging at the gasoline
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pump or taking advantage of charitable giving, or insurance fraud. And I’ve
made that clear to our attorney general.
(President George W. Bush speaking about the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, 31 August 2005)2
It is our legendary phenomenon, our great thing, our world-famous impossi-
bility … It is, however, as human things go, very real, superreal. What is barely
hinted at in other American cities is condensed and enlarged in New York.
(Saul Bellow, 1970/1994: 217)
Introduction
As the first two quotations indicate, the term Zero Tolerance is now regu-
larly deployed in a wide range of circumstances when there is a need to indi-
cate strong measures and clear resolve. More particularly, the term has
become a recognizable feature of the crime control landscape. Used by
politicians, policy-makers, police officers and others, the signals it sends
about toughness have been enormously seductive in these punitive times.
Though it may seem to many observers to be a relatively new term, it has a
fairly lengthy history. Our concern in this article is with the different con-
texts in which Zero Tolerance has been used and within this to explore the
emergence of the term in its particular, recent form.
For some time now we have been concerned with the diffusion of crimino-
logical ideas: how some ideas become popularized at particular moments, how
their popularity, or at least usage, spreads and what happens to them in the
process of dissemination (see, for example, Jones and Newburn, 2007). The
initial uses of the term Zero Tolerance in North America were in connection
first with the war on drugs and then later with specific campaigns against vio-
lence against women. During the 1990s, however, the term came to be closely
associated with police reforms in New York City and the various attempts that
have been made to develop similar approaches in other parts of the world. It
is this manifestation of Zero Tolerance that forms our focus here. In the first
part of this article, we provide a genealogy of the term and some of the prac-
tices associated with it. As we shall see, it has a varied history, having been
used in a number of different policy contexts. In the second section, we exam-
ine what the story has to say about ways in which criminological ideas and
innovations emerge and travel across jurisdictional and policy boundaries. In
the final section, we explore the ways in which powerful symbols such as Zero
Tolerance are deployed, who deploys them and why.
The genealogy of Zero Tolerance
Zero Tolerance and the war on drugs
It is difficult to specify a particular set of policy interventions that charac-
terize Zero Tolerance anti-drug policies. The term has been used primarily
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as a rhetorical device, used to signal uncompromising and authoritative
action by the State and its agencies, against an external and internal enemy.
It has denoted an unambiguous faith in a criminal justice response to the
problem of drugs, diversion of resources to enforcement from other
responses (such as treatment), harsher punishments and a weakening of
‘due process’ considerations in favour of those of ‘crime control’.
The term Zero Tolerance first gained prominence during the US ‘war on
drugs’ initiated under the Reagan administration. The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse
Act recommended the establishment of a cabinet-level ‘drugs czar’ and very
significant increases in the drugs law enforcement and interdiction budgets.
Central to the changes in US drugs policy was pressure and influence exerted
by the parents’ movement, including groups such as PRIDE (Parents Resource
Institute for Drug Education) and the NFP (National Federation of Parents for
Drug-Free Youth). These groups emphasized total opposition to drug use, and
promoted Zero Tolerance in as far as ‘they regarded full opposition as the only
acceptable course’ (Massing, 2000: 151). The US First Lady, Nancy Reagan,
made a key intervention following her widely reported visit to a school in
Oakland, California, when she stated: ‘We only make this trip once. Let’s
make it count and just say no to drugs’ (quoted in Massing, 2000: 174, empha-
sis added). Following this, ‘Just Say No Clubs’ for schoolchildren proliferated
and the term ‘Just Say No’ became everlastingly attached to the First Lady.
Though there is no record of her using the phrase Zero Tolerance, her cam-
paign and her rhetoric were at one with the sentiment. During this time, the
US Customs Commissioner, William Von Raab, was attempting increasingly
to militarize his department’s role in the war on drugs.3 Inspired by the policy
of a San Diego District Attorney whereby all drugs offenders were being pros-
ecuted and, wherever possible punished, no matter how minor the offence, he
decided on a similar approach for the Customs Department. He also per-
suaded the State Department to revoke passports of those convicted of drugs
offences. According to Baum, he ‘cast around for a name for his policy and
remembered that in the Nixon White House, chief of staff Bob Haldeman had
a policy he called “zero defect”. Von Raab decided to call his policy “zero tol-
erance”’ (1996: 244). The 1986 Act had established a conference, to be called
the White House Conference for a Drug-Free America (WHCDFA), which sat
during 1987 and early 1988, and reported in June 1988. Among its conclu-
sions was an explicit statement that: ‘The U.S. national policy must be zero tol-
erance for illegal drugs’ (WHCDFA, 1988, emphasis added).
The Zero Tolerance rhetoric established under Reagan was continued by
George Bush (who as Vice-President had taken the lead on drugs policy). In
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress voted to increase massively the
budgets for enforcement and punishment. Continuing the approach, the
subtitle of the 1998 Act was the ‘Drug-Free America Policy’.4 In his first tel-
evision address to the nation on 5 September 1989, President Bush said: 
All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is
drugs … The rules have changed: if you sell drugs, you will be caught; and
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when you’re caught, you will be prosecuted; and once you’re convicted, you
will do time. Caught, prosecuted, punished … American cocaine users need
to understand that our nation has zero tolerance for casual drug use.
(Bertram et al., 1996: 114)
He continued, ‘Zero tolerance isn’t just a policy, it’s an attitude. My admin-
istration will be telling the dealers: whatever we have to do, we’ll do, but
your day is over, you’re history’ (Baum, 1996: 244).
Following President Bush’s inaugural address there were fewer references
to Zero Tolerance in relation to drugs. Indeed, from that stage on the term
appeared in other settings, usually where the speaker wished to indicate a
firmness of resolve without having to set out detailed policy prescriptions.
For example, it was reported in early 1990 that a Commission appointed
by President Bush to investigate aviation security in the aftermath of the
Lockerbie disaster recommended that the USA should adopt Zero Tolerance
to terrorism by engaging in pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes like the 1986
bombing raids on Libya.5
Zero Tolerance and violence against women
The second crime context in which Zero Tolerance appears is in connection
with work and campaigning around violence against women. Two cam-
paigns, the first in Canada, the second in Edinburgh, Scotland, used the
term as a core part of their strategies to publicize the problem of women’s
violent victimization and to signify the unacceptability of such violence.
In Canada, a number of high-profile initiatives in the early 1990s sought to
improve the level of awareness of violence against women. The Canadian
Panel on Violence Against Women was established in 1991 by the Prime
Minister, and reported in 1993 (Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women,
1993). This report presented a National Action Plan, at the heart of which was
a policy of Zero Tolerance signalling ‘that no level of violence is acceptable,
and women’s safety and equality are priorities’ (1993: Part Five: 3). Health
Canada (1999) acknowledged that ‘the term was originally used in the United
States as part of the War on Drugs strategy’ and their approach was to com-
mandeer the term and rework it to fit the needs of the new context. Again it
signalled intolerance: on this occasion not intolerance by the State of certain
forms of offending, but rather intolerance by women of men’s violence. It also
signalled the aim that such intolerance should be much more widely shared
throughout civil society.
Almost simultaneously with the Canadian campaign, though clearly influ-
enced by it, the Zero Tolerance Campaign (ZTC) was launched in Edinburgh
in November 1992 by the City Council’s Women’s Committee. The
Edinburgh ZTC was the first major UK crime prevention campaign to
focus on the issue of male violence against women. The campaign aimed
to raise awareness about the extent and nature of male violence against
women and children, to send out a clear message that such crimes should
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not be tolerated and to promote a national strategy to combat male violence.
ZTC used posters, billboards and cinema advertising, all carrying a stark Z
symbol, to carry the central message of the campaign that male abuse of
power is a crime. In 1995 the Zero Tolerance Charitable Trust was estab-
lished following the success of the Edinburgh campaign (see http://www
.zerotolerance.org.uk/). The campaign was taken up by many local author-
ities in Scotland and continues today, having spread through the European
Union in the late 1990s and internationally as far as South Australia and,
intriguingly given what has happened since, New York City. The adoption
of the term by women’s groups is testament both to its power and to its
flexibility. This is a phrase that can be deployed in various national set-
tings, speaking to different audiences, but conveying a determination to
use the criminal law to ‘crack down on’ something that has previously
flourished.
Zero Tolerance and policing
Zero Tolerance and New York City
The policing practices that became associated with Zero Tolerance policing
(ZTP) were introduced to the New York Police Department (NYPD)6
following the election of Rudolph Giuliani as Mayor in 1993, and the
appointment of William Bratton as his first Chief of Police in early 1994
(Silverman, 1999). During his 1993 election campaign, Giuliani had met
with Bratton, then Chief of Police in Boston, and the criminologist George
Kelling, to discuss policing initiatives, asking if it was ‘conceivable to assign
police officers to the task of restoring order on the streets’, removing ‘the
panhandlers and squeegee operators’ (Barrett, 2000: 244). The focus upon
‘quality of life’ offences derives from Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) ‘Broken
Windows’ thesis, which emphasized the role of informal social controls in
helping contain crime in local neighbourhoods. A key theme in this work
was the ways in which routine minor incivilities and disorder (such as van-
dalism, graffiti and litter) are the basis of a vicious circle. It is argued that
increasing fear of crime related to disorder leads to a growing reluctance
among many citizens to use public space, which in turn reduces natural sur-
veillance in local areas, which then heightens the risk of further increases in
disorder and eventually, of more serious crimes. This thesis provided the
justification for public police resources to be targeted upon problems that
perhaps, over recent decades, had received less attention than serious crime.
The renewed focus upon the ideas of ‘Broken Windows’ chimed with other
developments in New York at the time. For example, New York Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan published an influential report in 1993 in which
he talked of ‘defining deviancy down’. Moynihan argued that increasing
levels of crime and deviance in the USA had led to such behaviour being
generally viewed as ‘normal’ with the result that the public (and police) had
become overly tolerant of previously unacceptable forms of conduct
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(Moynihan, 1993). The phrase ‘defining deviancy down’ quickly became a
central feature of debates about crime and disorder, particularly within
New York. For example, it was explicitly used by Rudolph Giuliani in 1994
to justify the more intensive policing of ‘squeegee pests’ (Karmen, 1994).
Although, as we see later, the main players in the New York policing story
distanced themselves from the term Zero Tolerance, it became inextricably
associated with the policing approaches developed under Bill Bratton.
Although often simplistically portrayed as a rigorous enforcement-oriented
mode of policing, the key elements of ‘quality of life’ policing in New York
(which came to be (mis)labelled ‘Zero Tolerance’) were more complex than
this. They included the following elements:
• vigorous law-enforcement responses to minor crime and disorder;
• the use of civil remedies against those perceived to be involved in criminal
activities;
• enhanced accountability, using Compstat (see later), of local police man-
agers for crime and disorder in their areas;
• public target setting in relation to crime reduction;
• conspicuous use of the media as a public relations tool on behalf of the
police and policing strategies; and
• aggressive enforcement action against street crimes.
A central element of this approach involved ‘crackdowns’ on public begging,
low-level incivilities, public drunkenness and urination, fare dodging and,
most famously of all, ‘squeegeeing’. It was these crackdowns, and related
actions against more serious offences that became closely associated with Zero
Tolerance. The fifth of the eight new policing strategies published by the
NYPD at this time was called ‘Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York’. It
was, according to Bratton, the ‘lynchpin’ strategy in New York City: ‘We were
going to fix the broken windows and prevent anyone from breaking them
again’ (Bratton with Knobler, 1998: 229, emphasis added). A second theme to
the New York policing reforms was significantly increased use of the civil
law as a mechanism for reducing crime or criminal opportunities (Kelling,
1998). This strategy was initially developed under Bratton’s predecessors as
Commissioner of the NYPD, Lee Brown and Ray Kelly. The third component
of the NYPD’s approach involved the development of a management infor-
mation and control system for regulating and directing policing at precinct
level—Compstat (Bratton, 1997; Silverman, 1999). Bill Bratton described the
twice-weekly Compstat meetings as requiring precinct commanders ‘to be
ready to review their up-to-date computer-generated crime statistics and relate
what things are going to be done to achieve crime reduction’ (1997: 38).
Although arguably less reported than the more intensive focus upon ‘quality
of life’ offences, Giuliani, Bratton and senior members of Bratton’s team attrib-
uted a significant degree of credit to Compstat for the crime reductions in New
York City (Bratton with Knobler, 1998; Maple, 2000; Kirtzman, 2001).
Another part of the policing approach in New York involved highly publicized
target setting for himself and his Department. This involved regular use of the
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media as a key element by which he communicated both with his Department
and with the citizens of New York. The final core element of the strategy
involved high visibility order maintenance involving a specialist NYPD team
called the ‘Street Crimes Unit’. This was a plain clothes elite unit that worked
across the city—rather than being located in particular precincts or even bor-
oughs. The unit was tasked with aggressive action against street crime, focus-
ing in particular upon stopping and searching young men suspected of carrying
concealed firearms. Although credited with many successes, the unit also con-
tributed to many of the less positive aspects of ‘quality of life’ policing, not
least the shooting of Amadou Diallou, an unarmed 22-year-old black man
shot 19 times by street crimes unit officers.
Zero Tolerance in the UK
In the UK, experiments with so-called ZTP have been limited to a few local-
ized initiatives that have in practice adopted only elements of the New York
approach. The Metropolitan Police in King’s Cross, London, undertook a
vigorous campaign to ‘clean up’ the area by focusing as much on minor
infractions and incivilities as on major crimes. One of their operations, enti-
tled Operation Zero Tolerance, ran for six weeks in late 1996 and involved
25 police officers who were tasked ‘to clamp down on all crime in the area,
however apparently trivial or irrelevant’ (‘The petty crime way’, Guardian
21 November 1996). The only major explicit attempt to introduce a form
of ZTP occurred in Hartlepool, in the north of England, under the guidance
of Detective Superintendent Ray Mallon, one of the few British police offi-
cers of any seniority to have embraced the idea of Zero Tolerance.
According to him, what this meant in Hartlepool was ‘that the police would
“return peace to the streets” by controlling minor situations in the interest
of the “decent” and “respectable” citizen’ (Dennis and Mallon, 1997: 65).
The majority of senior British police officers, however, were openly scepti-
cal about notions of Zero Tolerance, and there has been considerable resist-
ance to the idea of importing wholesale ‘New York’-style policing practices
(see Griffiths, 1997; Pollard, 1997). The then Deputy Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police, Ian Blair, typified such views when he argued that, 
normally liberal New Yorkers and their media were prepared [in the 1990s]
for policing tactics that would not be acceptable in London or anywhere else
in the UK. Zero tolerance is a misnomer: it actually means targeted intoler-
ance, and New York’s finest did not always tread lightly.
(2002: 22)
In contrast to senior police officers, however, from the mid-1990s many
politicians enthusiastically deployed Zero Tolerance terminology. Jack
Straw, then Shadow Home Secretary, visited New York in July 1995 and
following this delivered a speech in which he attacked the ‘aggressive beg-
ging of winos and addicts’ and the ‘squeegee merchants who wait at large
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road junctions to force on reticent motorists their windscreen cleaning
service … Even where graffiti is not comprehensible or racialist in message’
he went on, ‘it is often violent and uncontrolled in its violent image, and
correctly gives the impression of a lack of law and order on the streets’
(quoted in Newburn, 1998: 201). Echoing his Shadow Home Secretary,
Tony Blair made a controversial speech in January 1997 in which he out-
lined his view of Zero Tolerance. Asked by the editor of the Big Issue
whether he supported the policy, he replied: ‘Yes I do, it is important that
you say we don’t tolerate the small crimes. It says you don’t tolerate the
graffiti on the wall.’7 He continued: ‘Obviously, some people will interpret
this in a way which is harsh and unpleasant, but I think the basic principle
is here to say: yes it is right to be intolerant of people homeless on the
streets.’ During the election campaign, while appearing in Hartlepool, Jack
Straw sought to soften the message of intolerance by pointing out that New
Labour’s strategy was much broader: ‘Tackling youth crime is an integral
part of our strategy to reduce anti-social behaviour and create a more
decent society.’ This he called ‘zero tolerance with a British face’.8
As early as December 1995, Tony Blair had signalled his willingness to
use the term in a much broader manner to signify a more general style in
which New Labour would operate. Launching proposals for improving
educational standards, he promised to ‘sweep away the second rate and
tackle head-on the half-baked and the ineffective’, adding: ‘There will be
zero tolerance of failure from any government I lead.’9 The same message
eventually found its way into the Labour Party election manifesto in 1997,
a section on schools being entitled ‘Zero Tolerance to Underperformance’.
Later in the manifesto, the party reiterated its support of a crackdown
approach to ‘quality of life’ offences:
The Conservatives have forgotten the ‘order’ part of ‘law and order’. We will
tackle the unacceptable level of anti-social behaviour and crime on our
streets. Our ‘zero tolerance’ approach will ensure that petty criminality
among young offenders is seriously addressed.
It was at this stage that Zero Tolerance as political rhetoric really took off.
Though both the Conservative Home Secretary and his Shadow visited New
York and made positive statements about what was happening there, the
term ‘Zero Tolerance’ was appropriated primarily by New Labour. This
period from mid-1995 to late 2000 was the high point for deployment of the
term. The period was ushered in by Straw and Blair, using the language of
Zero Tolerance as part of New Labour’s strategy to outflank the incumbent
Tories. The era ended with an internal squabble within the Conservative
Party. At the Party’s annual conference in 2000 the Shadow Home Secretary,
Ann Widdecombe, announced a ‘Zero Tolerance policy’ on all drugs, includ-
ing cannabis. Despite the standing ovation she received in the conference
hall, there was what some journalists described as ‘widespread alarm in the
party’ when the potential implications of the proposal became apparent
together with the revelation that she had failed to consult either the Shadow
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Cabinet or the police prior to the speech.10 She was quickly ordered to
backtrack and in due course the policy was quietly dropped.
In more recent times, talk of Zero Tolerance has lessened, though it still
reappears from time to time in connection with matters such as abuse
against public sector workers,11 especially within the NHS12 and discipline
in schools.13 Wherever it is deployed the ‘New York miracle’ is almost
always invoked. Speaking in Hartlepool in August 2004, and flanked by the
City’s mayor, Ray Mallon, Michael Howard summarized much of the
recent story of ZTP:
We need to police our streets—not de-police them. We need a police force
which intervenes, confronts and challenges every kind of crime and disorder—
from graffiti and litter to burglary and robbery. In short we need zero toler-
ance policing. As Ray has shown in Middlesbrough, and Rudi Giuliani showed
in New York, by challenging disorder you begin to claim ground back from
the yobs and hoodlums controlling our cities. You demonstrate that there is a
line people cannot cross—and as police confidence rises in challenging unac-
ceptable behaviour, so public confidence rises in the police. By challenging so-
called small crimes head-on, you push back the burglars, car thieves and drug
dealers responsible for so much of the crime in Britain today.14
Continued sightings of the term are testimony to its enduring power and
resonance. Nevertheless, Ann Widdecombe’s speech in 2000 undoubtedly
marked the point at which the term Zero Tolerance began to lose some of
its lustre in British political life. Having surveyed briefly the different con-
texts within which Zero Tolerance has been used and the various practices
associated with it, we turn our attention now to what this story has to tell
us about the ways in which criminological ideas emerge and cross jurisdic-
tional boundaries and what happens to them when they travel.
The international diffusion of Zero Tolerance
In a recent study of policy transfer and criminal justice, we concluded that
there was clear evidence of some degree of policy transfer between the USA
and UK in the case of Zero Tolerance policing (Jones and Newburn, 2007).
Overall, we found that the timing of developments on either side of the
Atlantic, and degrees of policy similarity (on a number of dimensions) were
consistent with a picture of possible policy transfer. Second, there was sub-
stantial evidence of extensive transatlantic contact connected with these policy
developments, including visits to New York City by civil servants, politicians
and police officers from the UK with the explicit aim of observing and draw-
ing lessons from policing approaches in the NYPD (Jones and Newburn,
2007). Within this broad picture, however, there were a number of particular
features of diffusion of policy ideas between the USA and UK regarding ZTP.
First, as we have seen, policy transfer was most apparent in the use of
rhetoric and symbols, rather than in the more concrete manifestation of
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policy content and instruments, at least in the realm of policing policy
(Jones and Newburn, 2007). Despite the extent of the British ‘policy tourism’
to New York City during the late 1990s, and significant efforts to sell ZTP
in the UK by policy entrepreneurs from the USA, sightings of ‘New York
Style’ policing have been rare in the UK. Many senior UK police officers, the
majority of whom embraced a post-Scarman report, community policing-
oriented consensus, have found the more abrasive elements of Zero Tolerance
problematic. Though there have been one or two minor and conspicuous
exceptions, police forces in Britain have rejected both the terminology and
the practices associated with Zero Tolerance. Even in the most conspicuous
exception to this pattern, the policing initiative conducted under Detective
Chief Inspector Ray Mallon in Hartlepool which embraced the idea of Zero
Tolerance, there is relatively little evidence of ‘hard’ policy transfer, in
terms of direct importation of concrete policies from the USA (Jones and
Newburn, 2007). Thus, to the extent that anything directly crossed the
Atlantic it was terminology and ideas (if we incorporate ‘Broken Windows’
in the broader sphere of influence) rather than policies and practices. The
phrase Zero Tolerance proved to be particularly popular with politicians
and, though less so today, is still occasionally wheeled out when particular
figures are seeking to emphasize their toughness in the law and order arena.
Having said this, however, there was clear evidence of substantial ‘soft
transfer’ in the broader ideas and principles associated with the Broken
Windows approach that have gone on to be enormously influential in UK
crime control beyond the domain of policing.
Second, the limited degree of hard transfer in the arena of ZTP reflects
the contrasting political, legal and cultural contexts in which policing takes
place, and these present difficulties for straightforward importing of poli-
cies and practices from abroad. For example, we suggest that the constitu-
tional position of the police in the UK, and in particular the relative
autonomy of senior police officers from direction by populist politicians,
contributed to the limited degree of emulation of specific policing policies
and practices developed in New York.
Third, the Zero Tolerance story sheds light on the part played by policy
transfer in the complex processes of public policy formulation. In particu-
lar, it sheds some light on the roles of policy entrepreneurs, politicians,
practitioners and ‘public intellectuals’ in the diffusion of policy ideas and
practices. It is clear that the influence of certain key academics was vital,
both in terms of the original formulation of the ideas and their later pro-
motion. As we have outlined earlier, the policing approaches that became
associated with Zero Tolerance have often been justified with reference to
the ideas of two US academics, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. The
original ‘Broken Windows’ article was published in 1982 and, though it
received some coverage, was by no means immediately influential, nor was
it necessarily expected to be. As George Kelling noted in an interview, ‘Jim
Wilson and I at times chuckle about the legs of the article. Had we known
it was going to have the legs that it has, we might have been a little more
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cautious in our writing at times!’ The ideas within the article did not emerge
from a programme of systematic empirical research. Rather they were a
series of hypotheses that were to some degree extrapolated from the reported
experiences of front-line police officers, and residents of housing estates
with whom Kelling, in particular, had contact in the course of his academic
research. The development and spread of ideas that became associated
with Zero Tolerance provides an interesting and rare example of ‘public
intellectuals’ having a very major impact on crime control policy. Kelling
had already developed a close relationship with Bill Bratton during the lat-
ter’s earlier incarnation as Chief of the New York Transit Police. As he
explained himself:
Can you imagine an academic having an idea and being asked by the New
York City subway system to implement that idea …? This is, for an aca-
demic, like going to heaven because this is the media capital of the world.
(George Kelling, research interview)
Bratton confirmed the importance of the influence of Wilson and Kelling’s
ideas upon his approaches, and in particular his relationship with Kelling,
who had been a key adviser during his time at the Transit Police and later
the NYPD. For Bratton, 
Kelling articulated and put into beautiful words what I had found from
experience. I supported what he wrote because I had already lived it … We
began to apply [the ideas] to crime in the subways. Fare evasion was the
biggest broken window in the transit system. We were going to fix that win-
dow and see to it that it didn’t get broken again.
(Bratton and Andrews, 1998: 138–9, 152)
Kelling also made efforts to promote his ideas abroad, addressing senior
police officers and attending meetings with high-level politicians in the UK
for example. This all occurred during a period in which many academic
criminologists, who would probably subscribe to the importance of ‘public
sociology’ (Burawoy, 2005), despaired of the possibility that their ideas and
research might have a major influence over crime policy in the UK.
Paradoxically, the ideas associated with ZTP and Broken Windows were
subjected to major criticism from academic criminologists on both sides of
the Atlantic, who brought into question both the empirical justification for
such policing approaches as well as the political assumptions that under-
pinned such notions (see, for example, Bowling, 1999; Harcourt, 2001).
And yet it seemed that the more that academics lined up to attack Broken
Windows policing and its variants, the more attractive the ideas became to
politicians (if not to senior police officers in the UK).
Finally, a process of ‘elite networking’ was essential to the dissemination
of the initial ideas that had originated in the USA (Jones and Newburn,
2007). In particular, a number of free market think tanks—the Manhattan
Institute in the USA and the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) in the UK—
were centrally involved in the promotion of ‘quality of life’ policing, and the
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ideas that underpin such approaches (Wacquant, 1999a). The Manhattan
Institute promoted the work of James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (a Fellow
of the Institute) via a series of seminars aimed at politicians, policy-makers and
criminal justice professionals (see Mone, 2002). Rudy Giuliani was one high-
profile participant in these seminars. The Manhattan Institute was both a con-
tributor to Giuliani’s mayoral campaign (Barrett, 2000) and provided financial
support for and promoted George Kelling and Catherine Coles’ book that fol-
lowed up the original Atlantic Monthly article, Fixing Broken Windows
(Kelling and Coles, 1996). After his period as Commissioner of Police under
Giuliani, Bill Bratton became a regular lecturer at Manhattan Institute
events and later an ‘international consultant’ in urban policing. Through
seminars at this and other similar organizations like the Heritage Foundation
(Bratton, 1996) and articles in the Manhattan Institute’s house magazine,
the City Journal (see, for example, Bratton and Andrews, 1998), Bratton
became the key proselytizer on behalf of ‘quality of life’ policing (Wacquant,
1999b). Myron Magnet, Editor of the City Journal, described part of its
activities in the following way:
One of the things that we do at the Manhattan Institute, and this is not my
department so I’m not quite sure how it’s organized, but we go down to South
America with Bill Bratton and some of his former lieutenants, and try to help
them. And this is not national governments, but this is city governments in var-
ious Latin American cities, … like Rio, where crime is just off the chart, and try
to teach them how to police. And, you know, they’re incredibly receptive to it. 
(Myron Magnet, research interview)
Bratton subsequently, through his autobiography (Bratton and Knobler,
1998), and widespread travels, took his message around the world. In the
UK the key event was a seminar organized by the IEA in London in 1997.15
In an interview, Bratton explained the genesis of the event and the role of
the two think tanks in bringing ZTP to public attention in the UK:
A sister institution … the Manhattan Institute, that puts out a City Journal
and through that group I came over [to England] with the editor … Myron
Magnet, and the president of the Manhattan Institute ... They’re both
[Manhattan Institute and IEA] conservative think tanks, the Manhattan
Institute had significantly influenced a lot of Giuliani’s thinking, social and
crime policies, and so we were asked to come over. Steve Goldsmith, the
mayor of Indianapolis, came over to talk about privatization of city services,
I was asked to speak on crime, and that’s how that conference came about,
and [the Zero Tolerance] book actually. 
(Bill Bratton, research interview)
According to David Green, who worked at the IEA at that time, the per-
sonal impact of Bratton was considerable:
[W]e had two or three seminars, lunchtime seminars, evening things and a
big conference, which was mainly attended by police, about a hundred and
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odd people from ... various police forces in England and Wales, and he was
a very impressive guy. He just stood up, walked away from the lectern, stood
in the middle of the stage at the front … you know, didn’t have any notes,
just spoke as if he were … briefing his chaps before he sent them out on the
street. You know there were all these constables, sergeants and inspectors.
He was a very impressive person. You could see how he would be an inspi-
rational leader. And I think that had some kind of influence. Ray Mallon
also spoke that day. 
(David Green, research interview)
The association of the term Zero Tolerance with developments in New
York arises partly from media fondness for the term. But this has been
explicitly encouraged by the conscious framing of much of the dissemina-
tion activity outlined earlier. In particular, many of the public seminars and
conferences designed to generate interest in these forms of policing actively
promoted the term. Such events, and the publications associated with them
(Dennis, 1997) have been vital in disseminating the idea of ZTP. Bratton’s
many well-publicized trips to the UK, including to the event organized by
the IEA in 1997, have all involved the term Zero Tolerance in some shape
or form. The IEA conference for example, the most highly publicized of all,
was organized to coincide with the publication of a short book entitled:
Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society, though Bratton commented that he
‘did not know that was going to be the title of the book’ and in its second
edition explicitly sought to distance himself from the term. Indeed, Bratton
argues that he never consciously used the term in relation to the strategies
adopted by the NYPD under his command:16
The term was used in New York and applied to the issue of police corrup-
tion which we had a major problem with, a major scandal back in ’93/94,
and the use of drugs by police officers. New York City has a zero tolerance
policy for use of drugs—[use drugs and] you’re fired. Other cities they give
you a second chance. So the term zero tolerance was used, to my awareness,
in those two arenas … I can’t find any place where I used it, in terms of writ-
ings or speeches. There were seven written strategies put out when we came
in—on drugs, youth crime, etc. And I think it may have been used there …
Did Giuliani possibly use it? Possibly, but I don’t have a recollection of hear-
ing him saying it either. 
(Bill Bratton, research interview)
The IEA event garnered significant publicity. According to David Green, it
was attended by a number of influential journalists including, John Witherow
(one-time editor of the Sunday Times), Sir David English (editor-in-chief of
Associated Newspapers) and Conrad Black (the owner of the Telegraph titles).
With connections such as these, policy entrepreneurs like the Manhattan
Institute and the IEA played a crucial role in generating publicity for the par-
ticular brand of policing associated with the crime decline in New York.
Almost without exception, articles in the British newsmedia subsequent to the
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IEA event used the term Zero Tolerance as their preferred means of describing
such policing strategies and; as we have seen; a number of very senior politi-
cians all embraced the terminology. Nevertheless, it remains the case that it is
at the level of rhetoric rather than policing practice that Zero Tolerance was
primarily influential; and the next question to address, therefore, is why has
it; been so powerful a symbol?
The symbolic power of Zero Tolerance
In general we can identify at least five major reasons why the term Zero
Tolerance became so popular:
1 it is an apparently simple notion;
2 it is flexible—it has no fixed meaning;
3 it has strong symbolic potential;
4 in policy terms it became associated with a clear ‘meta-narrative’; and
5 it resonates with contemporary concerns.
Let us take each of these in turn. First, one of the central reasons for the
popularity of the term Zero Tolerance is the apparently simple message that
it conveys; the message being that some form of conduct will no longer be
accepted. Thus, governments wishing to indicate that they will seek to end
illicit drug use, women’s groups campaigning for an end to men’s violence
against women and politicians wanting to indicate that antisocial conduct
will be swept from the streets can all do so by utilizing this term. That they
can do so illustrates the second reason for its popularity: its flexibility. The
term, albeit in different guises, has survived several mutations over a
lengthy period. That Zero Tolerance as a crime control term has been with
us for the best part of three decades is testimony to its fecundity. In relation
to policing it has been found, in various forms, across the UK, in France,
Italy, Germany, Sweden and other parts of the European Union, as well as
in Latin America and Australia (Wacquant, 1999a; Dixon and Maher,
2005). Arguably, it is this very flexibility that has enabled it to spread so
widely. Although much of the literature on policy transfer is concerned with
how faithfully policies are copied from one jurisdiction to another, it may
be that it is only in relation to concrete policies, where programmes of
action are concerned, that fidelity is especially important (Deacon, 1999).
By contrast, in the area of symbols and rhetoric, such as this, it can be
argued by contrast that it is precisely the ability to be flexible in copying
concepts and ideas that allows them to survive. A term like Zero Tolerance
may shift from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but its meanings will almost cer-
tainly vary with context. Yet the concept may retain its plausibility irre-
spective of the faithfulness of the copy in existence.
Third, although some of the more concrete policies and practices associ-
ated with the term have clearly been promoted by academics and police
practitioners, Zero Tolerance has been most often deployed by politicians.
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Bill Bratton drew attention to the political power of such symbolism when
he noted that: ‘[Giuliani] didn’t understand quality of life [policing] … but
he was a sponge … He caught the wave. He understood about the frustra-
tion about fear of crime. He understood that Republicans needed to do
something about it’ (Barrett, 2000: 345)—and, he might have added,
needed to be seen to be doing something about it. It is here that the concept
really works, because it has considerable symbolic power. ‘Zero Tolerance’
has become a staple of political and policy discourse—particularly in the
area of crime and criminal justice. The first sighting of the term occurred
during the ratcheting up of the ‘war on crime’ under President Reagan in
the early 1980s. And, yet, as the brief genealogy of the term earlier illus-
trated, it is sufficiently flexible and powerful to be usable in relation to a
range of public policy issues covering such matters as drug control, violence
against women, policing antisocial behaviour, looting in the aftermath of a
natural disaster and responses to the carrying of handguns in schools. It is
worth noting in this regard one important distinction between the use of
Zero Tolerance in the context of drug policy in the 1980s and domestic vio-
lence in the 1990s as against its more recent policing-related guise. In the
first two major crime control contexts in which Zero Tolerance terminol-
ogy appeared, it was invested with a degree of literalness. As the US anti-
drug legislation of the 1980s indicated, those that framed it really did
believe that the aim of a ‘drug-free America’ was appropriate—however dif-
ficult to achieve. Similarly, the feminist campaigners behind the Zero
Tolerance campaigns were clear that Zero Tolerance was the appropriate
moral position to take. By contrast, the idea of Zero Tolerance policing is
altogether more problematic. There is no practical possibility of engaging in
any form of Zero Tolerance policing: it is simply not possible for the police
to enforce all laws, or alternatively, to enforce some laws, all the time. Nor
is it wise, many would argue, to imply that such things might be possible or
desirable. In part, this is perhaps the reason that senior police figures have
tended to shy away from using the term, yet politicians continued to find it
seductive. According to George Kelling:
I never used [the term Zero Tolerance], Bratton used it once when he
referred to corruption. Giuliani used it sparingly and finally focused on …
the term Quality of Life … But I think Zero Tolerance gained currency
because it was liked by both the Left and the Right. 
(research interview)
Given how seldom the term appears to have been used, how did it come to
have such currency? The answer in part lies with the crime drop in New York
in the 1990s and the way in which a specific style of policing became so
closely associated with such perceived success. Though policing tactics were
undoubtedly important, they are far from the whole story. In fact, the so-
called ‘New York miracle’ was perhaps at least as much a political miracle as
a social one (Lardner and Reppetto, 2000). Zero Tolerance in this context is
very much a dramaturgical device (Manning, 2001). It is a symbol, used to
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convey a mood and to impress an audience rather than in any concrete way
to describe a set of policies or to frame particular objectives. In the main,
therefore, it has been politicians, whose stock-in-trade is rhetoric and sym-
bolism, who have been the most frequent users of this terminology.
The fourth factor we wish to draw attention to in this brief review of the
power of the Zero Tolerance is its foundation upon a clear and apparently
plausible ‘policy narrative’. A policy narrative is a ‘story (scenarios and argu-
ments) which underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for policy-making in
situations that persist with many unknowns, a high degree of interdepend-
ence, and little, if any, agreement’ (Roe, 1994: 34). Emery Roe argues that the
pressure to develop ‘policy narratives’ is directly linked to the ambiguity of
the decision-maker’s experience. The more uncertain things seem to the deci-
sion-maker at both the micro- and macro-level, the greater is their need for
an ‘explanatory narrative’ that can be ‘operationalized into standard
approaches with widespread application’ (1994: 36).
Of what, then, does the narrative behind Zero Tolerance consist? The
specifics concern a number of fairly well-worn themes, including: crime con-
trol can be managed by criminal justice agencies (or, certainly, the State);
toughness is important; being punitive is effective; respectability and order
can be (and should be) imposed. In its most recent guise, the overall meta-nar-
rative of Zero Tolerance has, we would argue, three main components:
1 crime was reduced dramatically in New York in the 1990s;
2 the decrease was due in large part to strategies employed by the police; and
3 if it worked there, it can work here.
A number of authors have examined these claims and unpicked them one by
one (Bowling, 1999; Young, 1999; Karmen, 2000). In the area of the policy
narrative, however, this is not the central issue. As Roe argues, a convincing
policy narrative can persist in the face of strong empirical evidence against its
storyline. ‘Policy narratives can be representationally inaccurate—and recog-
nizably so—but still persist, indeed thrive’ (Roe, 1994: 51). The strength of
the policy narrative that lies behind Zero Tolerance (i.e. its ability to conjure
up the image of the New York ‘miracle’) is, in part, what gives it much of its
strength and helps it endure.
There are a number of factors that help sustain this narrative. First, crime
did go down, and dramatically, in New York (Zimring, 2006). Second, sen-
ior figures in New York worked tirelessly with sections of the newsmedia
to promote the idea that policing was central to the crime drop. In this they
were extremely successful, and politicians in Britain and elsewhere were
quickly and lastingly persuaded by the story of the ‘New York miracle’.
The fact that the crime ‘miracle’ occurred in New York was itself cultur-
ally important. Not only is New York the media capital of the world, but
it is also the source of many of our most enduring fictional images of crime
and crime-fighting. The stark lawlessness of Gotham City on the one hand,
and of its eventual rescue by superheroes who refuse to give in to the ‘bad
guys’ is a storyline that has been rehearsed so frequently that it neatly
frames many of our fears and our hopes about crime and its control.
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Finally, therefore, we would argue that the power of Zero Tolerance is to
be found in the way in which both the term and the meta-narrative under-
pinning it speak to a number of our most crucial contemporary concerns.
Manning (2001) has detailed the ‘spectacle politics’ of crime control under
Giuliani and Bratton in New York during this period and has argued, con-
vincingly we think, that part of the appeal of this drama was that it resonated
with ‘basic concerns—fear, security, change, “the other”, and with structural
features of life that recycle, reappear, change form and transmogrify’ (2001:
327). As Roe argues, the real strength of particular stories emerges ‘when one
narrative more than any other becomes the way we best articulate our “real”
feelings or make sense of the uncertainties and ambiguities around us’ (1994:
51). It is uncertainties and ambiguities that underpin what Jock Young has
described as our current ‘general cultural predisposition to believe in the easy
miracle and the instant cure’ (1999: 130). Zero tolerance is one of a series of
ideas that functions particularly effectively in this (late modern) environment.
It does so in a number of ways. It provides a political means of increasing
public trust in criminal justice agencies and crime control following the crisis
of confidence in the ability of the State to guarantee security. In this concep-
tion, ‘policymaking becomes a form of acting out that downplays the com-
plexities and long-term character of effective crime control in favour of
immediate gratifications of a more expressive alternative’ (Garland, 2001:
134, emphases in original).
More broadly, its function is, in part, to reaffirm faith in the rationality
and effectiveness of the political system; individual wants and desires are
being transformed into public policy. In this sense Zero Tolerance is an
example of what Murray Edelman calls a ‘condensation symbol’: ‘symbolic
forms that merge diverse anxieties and emotions with a shared expectation
about the time, the place, and the action that will evoke common support
and a common perception of an enemy’ (1971: 135). One of the reasons for
the power of the notion of ‘Zero Tolerance’ is its simplicity and its implicit
association, through the language of ‘intolerance’, with the metaphor of
‘war’. The successful spread of Zero Tolerance rhetoric around the globe
has, as we have argued, much to do with the coupling of the terminology
with the emerging narrative of the ‘New York miracle’, aided and abetted
by the moral entrepreneurship of Rudy Giuliani and Bill Bratton, both of
whom have carved out lucrative businesses in ‘selling’ Zero Tolerance-
related policing strategies in several continents. A highly plausible policy
narrative became firmly attached to a powerful dramaturgical symbol and
was promoted by influential and media-literate moral entrepreneurs. There
are few more potent mixtures.
Conclusions
The story of Zero Tolerance raises important issues concerning the diffu-
sion of policy ideas and practices, the complex nature of the public policy
process and the influence of public intellectuals within this. First, it is
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important not to over-estimate the degree of coherence of the policy-making
process. The idea of ‘evidence-led’ policy-making can be associated with a
highly rational model of public policy formulation in which policy emerges
from a distinct set of problem-solving processes: problem definition, for-
mulation of alternative solutions, weighing up the implications of alterna-
tives and experimentation with the preferred choice. Although having some
analytical value, this view is overly mechanistic and simplified as a model
of how policy-making actually works in practice. The content of policies is
negotiated continuously in the problem definition, legislation, regulation
and court decisions, and again in the decisions made by street-level bureau-
crats (Lipsky, 1980). Moreover, policy outcomes are frequently an unin-
tended by-product, or simply emerge very gradually. Understanding the
frequently serendipitous and unpredictable nature of policy-making should
make those who seek to influence think carefully about how such objectives
might be achieved.
Second, under anything other than the most auspicious circumstances, influ-
encing policy almost certainly requires considerable (moral) entrepre-
neurial activity. Put crudely, it is far from sufficient to publish and disseminate
research in traditional forum and anticipate that this will reach and influence
key stakeholders. In the case of Broken Windows and Zero Tolerance, a sig-
nificant amount of sustained activity, in different ways by both authors of the
original article, went into promulgating the ideas. One apparently particularly
effective form of such activity is ‘elite networking’: working directly with those
whose job it is to attempt to influence policy, such as think tanks and pressure
groups. Free market think tanks such as the Manhattan Institute and the
Institute of Economic Affairs were able to provide forums locally and interna-
tionally, in which ideas could be discussed and promoted. More particularly,
they provided means for two other forms of elite networking—direct work
with practitioners and use of the newsmedia—both of which arguably play a
vital role in the promotion of ideas. The third point concerns the importance
of thinking about what is likely to be attractive to policy-makers. This is inher-
ently problematic, given that ‘most researchers and policy makers ultimately
inhabit different worlds which differ significantly in terms of aims, values and
interests’ (Maguire, 2004: 226). The realities of the world of policy-making,
particularly in the unpredictable arena of crime politics, help explain the
apparent attractiveness and influence of the ideas associated with Zero
Tolerance. In this context, ideas which can be promoted using simple phrases
and attractive metaphors—‘hot spots’, ‘signal crimes’, ‘repeat victimization’—
appear to have a greater chance of influence than the unfiltered complexities
of empirical research.
Finally, and related to the previous point, one of the crucial lessons emerg-
ing from the story of Zero Tolerance is the importance of ‘policy narratives’.
Whether it be the ease with which the notion of Zero Tolerance took hold
in the UK, or the more substantive influence of the Broken Windows phi-
losophy, it is undoubtedly the case that both gained from their association
with one particular reading of the ‘New York miracle’. A relatively simple
and plausible policy narrative almost certainly both increases the likelihood
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that particular ideas will take hold and, once they do, will remain influential
(unless superseded by an equally powerful alternative narrative). Clearly, in
order to have an impact on public policy it is not sufficient simply to have a
powerful narrative. There must also be a ‘policy window’ (Kingdon, 1995)
that provides policy entrepreneurs with particular opportunities in the con-
text of a favourable constellation of political forces, combined with the main
problems arising on the agenda of politicians and policy-makers and the var-
ious solutions that are currently being offered. These windows of opportu-
nity provide space for advocates of particular ideas and approaches, but it
still remains for such people to take advantage of them. In many ways, the
policy narratives behind Zero Tolerance have been ‘of their time’ in that they
had a certain consonance with prevailing social and political conditions
(Garland, 2001). However, the influence of such narratives was by no means
inevitable. The agency of key individuals and organizations possessing a sig-
nificant degree of political acumen and practical advocacy skills has played
a major part in the story of the wider influence of Zero Tolerance.
None of the above should be read as an endorsement of the short-termism
and narrowness of view that afflicts much contemporary policy-making, still
less should it be understood as approval for the approaches associated with
Zero Tolerance policing. Indeed, in many ways, the story of Zero Tolerance
perhaps typifies the potential problems of valorizing expressive crime control
policies as against more ‘rational’ analyses of the likely long-term social and
economic costs/benefits of particular approaches. However, it is important,
first, to understand the power of such terminology and, second, to draw out
some of the lessons for other areas of criminological activity. The frustrations
of academic social scientists who seek to influence public policy are well doc-
umented in the arena of crime control as with other policy fields (Maguire,
2004: 218–19). However, as Garland and Sparks have observed: ‘[T]here is,
in the end, little point in being dismayed when governments behave politi-
cally. It is, after all, what they do’ (2000: 19). The danger lies in letting the
frustrations associated with the political arena lead to a form of ‘nothing
works’ mentality: a mindset that assumes that politicians will almost always
discount research findings and evidence in favour of other considerations
when constructing policy and, moreover, that there is nothing we can do
about this. Quite the contrary. However difficult and complicated it may
seem, it is by no means impossible to influence public understanding and
political decision-making regarding policy options. In this regard, the Broken
Windows and the Zero Tolerance stories—however unpalatable they may be
to many scholars—offer important insights for what, following Burawoy
(2005), one might term ‘public’ and ‘policy’ criminologies (Burawoy, 2005).
Notes
This article arises from a research project entitled ‘International Influences on
UK Crime Control Policy in the 1990s’ funded by the ESRC under their Future
Governance Research Programme (Grant no. L216252035). This article, in
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various different forms, was given at the Centre for Criminology, Oxford
University, the Mannheim Centre for Criminology, LSE, at the British
Criminology Conference, Keele University and at the American Political
Science Association, San Francisco. We are grateful to the organizers and par-
ticipants at all these events and also to Peter Hall for research assistance.
1. Quoted in Greenberg and Dratel (2005: 1048).
2. http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/09/president-bush-zero-tolerance-
for.php
3. Baum notes that von Raab suggested at a Drug Enforcement Policy Board
meeting chaired by Attorney General Ed Meese that ‘the air force should
be allowed to shoot down suspected drug-smuggling planes that didn’t
respond to warnings’ (1996: 239).
4. The declaration at the end of Title V of the Act states that: ‘It is the
declared policy of the United States Government to create a Drug-Free
America by 1995’ (quoted in Belenko, 2000: 318).
5. ‘Lockerbie Security Lapses Condemned’, Independent 16 May 1990.
6. In fact, Bratton had introduced a version of ‘quality of life policing’ to the
New York City Transit when he served as head of the Transit Police prior
to his appointment to the NYPD (Bratton, 1996).
7. ‘Clear Beggars from Streets, Says Blair’, The Times 7 January 1997.
8. ‘Blair Champions “Zero Tolerance” Despite Warning’, Daily Telegraph 11
April 1997.
9. ‘Teachers Savage Blair School Plan’, Guardian 6 December 1995.
10. ‘Widdecombe Causes Law and Disorder’, Daily Telegraph 5 November 2000.
11. ‘Blair Pledges New Powers to Protect Frontline Workers’, Independent 31
May 2001.
12. ‘Assaults Rise Despite Crackdown’, Guardian 27 March 2003.
13. ‘New Moves to Beat the Bullies’, Guardian 15 July 2004; ‘Task Force to
Tackle Discipline in Schools’, Guardian 21 May 2005.
14. http://politics.guardian.co.uk/conservatives/story/0,,1280083,00.html
15. Though as Young, one of the attendees at the seminar, reports, Bratton
‘started by totally distancing himself from the concept of zero tolerance …
and warned of the problem of transposing too easily techniques which
work in one context to another’ (1999: 124).
16. The IEA, in conjunction with the Sunday Times, played a similar role in
1989 when it introduced Charles Murray’s ‘underclass’ thesis into British
policy debates about combating poverty and social exclusion.
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